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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
LEWIS RICKY YATES, : Case No. 950444-CA 
Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995), whereby a defendant in a 
district court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals from a final judgment of conviction for any crime other 
than a first degree felony or capital felony. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTES 
The text of the following statutes is provided in 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-204(1) & (2) (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in refusing to sentence Appellant 
Lewis Ricky Yates ("Yates") for a class B misdemeanor where the 
reduction in penalties under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 
1995) was in effect at the time of his sentencing? 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. See State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
At sentencing, Yates argued that the legislative 
amendments to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, effective May 1, 1995, 
should apply to his sentencing. R. 133-34. The trial judge 
rejected Yates' argument and sentenced him for a class A 
misdemeanor. R. 81, 140-41. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Theft, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 
(1995) . Yates was charged by Information on November 22, 1994, 
with one count of Theft, a third degree felony. R. 5. As part 
of a plea bargain, Yates pled guilty on January 13, 1995, to one 
count of Theft, a class A misdemeanor. R. 17-24, 119-20. 
At the sentencing hearing on June 28, 1995, Yates argued 
that the legislative changes to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, 
effective May 1, 1995, required that he be sentenced for a 
class B misdemeanor. R. 133-34. The trial court rejected Yates' 
argument and sentenced him for a class A misdemeanor: one year 
in jail, $250 restitution, $500 recoupment fee to the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association, a $1000 fine, and an 85% surcharge. 
R. 81 (commitment), 140-42. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State claimed that Yates committed a theft by 
obtaining or exercising unauthorized control over the property of 
Raylynn Coumier with a purpose to deprive the owner thereof and 
that the value of the property was more than $250 and not more 
than $1000. R. 05. 
On January 13, 1995, as part of a plea bargain, Yates 
pled guilty to Theft, a class A misdemeanor. R. 17-24, 119-20. 
See Addendum B for transcript of R. 17-24, 119-20. The State 
amended the Information to theft, a class A misdemeanor, with 
said property having a value of more than $100 but not more than 
$250. R. 05, 112. See Addendum B for copy of Amended 
Information. 
The trial court set the case for sentencing on 
February 17, 1995. R. 121. Yates was subsequently released from 
jail and failed to appear at sentencing. R. 33. Yates was 
present for a hearing on March 13, 1995, at which time the trial 
court continued sentencing to April 14, 1995. R. 44. On 
April 14, 1995, Yates again failed to appear in court for 
sentencing and the trial court issued another no bail bench 
warrant. R. 48. On June 2, 1995, while Yates was present for 
another hearing, the trial court reset sentencing for June 28, 
1995. R. 55. 
On June 28, 1995, the trial court sentenced Yates for a 
class A misdemeanor: one year in jail, $250 restitution, $500 
recoupment fee to the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, a 
3 
$1000 fine, and an 85% surcharge. R. 81 (commitment), 140-42. 
At sentencing, Yates argued that he was entitled to a reduction 
in penalty based on the legislative changes to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-412 which make the theft of property having a value of 
less than $300 a class B misdemeanor. R. 132-34. The trial 
court rejected Yates' argument and sentenced him for a class A 
misdemeanor under the former theft statute. R. 140-41. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court committed reversible error in refusing to 
sentence Yates for a class B misdemeanor. Prior to Yates' 
sentencing, the amended theft statute had gone into effect. 
Pursuant to that amended statute, the actions which Yates 
admitted doing when he entered his guilty plea amounted to a 
class B misdemeanor. Regardless of whether Yates was responsible 
for a delay in sentencing, controlling case law and the 
legislative intent behind the amendment required that the trial 
judge sentence Yates under the lesser penalty of the statute in 
effect at the time of sentencing. This case should be remanded 
for imposition of a legal and correct sentence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO SENTENCE YATES PURSUANT TO THE LESSER 
PENALTIES IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF HIS SENTENCING. 
The legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412, 
effective May 1, 1995. The amendment raised the value of 
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property applicable for each classification of theft offense. 
Relevant portions of the version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
which went into effect May 1, 1995 state: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided 
in this chapter shall be punishable: . . . (c) 
as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen is or exceeds $3 00 but is less 
than $1,000; or (d) as a class B misdemeanor if 
the value of the property stolen is less than 
$300. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). 
The previous version of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 (1995) 
which was in effect at the time Yates entered his plea stated in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided 
in this chapter shall be punishable: . . . (c) 
as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does not 
exceed $250 . . . . 
Although Yates entered his plea when this previous version was in 
effect, at the time of Yates' sentencing, the current version of 
the statute had taken effect. 
Yates pled guilty to theft of property having a value of 
more than $100 but not more than $250. R. 17-18. The trial 
judge ordered Yates to pay $250 in restitution. R. 81.x 
1
 The actual value of the property was never established in 
the record. The prosecutor who appeared at the plea hearing stated 
that the restitution amount which apparently appeared in his file 
was $1235. R. 111. Defense counsel disagreed with that amount and 
indicated that a restitution hearing might be necessary. R. 112. 
A restitution hearing was not held. Instead, at sentencing, the 
trial judge ordered that restitution in the amount of $250 be paid. 
R. 81. Even if a restitution hearing had been held, the nature of 
the plea rather than the amount of restitution would have 
controlled. See People v. Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Colo. App. 
1979) . 
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In Belt v. Turner, 479 P.2d 791 (Utah 1971), the Supreme 
Court considered circumstances almost identical to those in the 
present case. The Belt Court held that the defendant was 
entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment which was in 
effect at the time of the defendant's sentencing. 
The defendant in Belt pled guilty to issuing a fraudulent 
check in the amount of $10. The trial judge placed the defendant 
on probation without imposing sentence. Belt violated probation 
by leaving the state. Almost a year after the trial court 
initially placed Belt on probation, Belt was brought before the 
court and sentenced. In the interim, the punishment for the 
crime committed by Belt had been statutorily reduced from a 
maximum of five years in prison to a maximum of six months in 
In concluding that Belt was entitled to the reduced 
punishment which was in effect at the time of sentencing, the 
Court stated: 
After the plaintiff had entered a plea of guilty 
to the charge made against him and prior to the 
imposition of sentence in this matter, the 
legislature amended the law so as to provide that 
the offense here charged against the plaintiff is 
punishable by a fine or imprisonment in the 
county jail for not more than six months. A new 
policy having been adopted by the legislature 
concerning the punishment for the offense we are 
here concerned with it should inure to the 
defendant's benefit even though the offense had 
been committed and the plea thereto made prior to 
the amendatory legislation. 
Belt, 479 P.2d at 792. 
The Belt Court relied on the rationale of the New York 
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Court of Appeals in People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956), 
where the Court stated: 
This application of statutes reducing punishment 
accords with the best modern theories concerning 
the functions of punishment in criminal law. 
According to these theories, the punishment or 
treatment of criminal offenders is directed 
toward one or more of three ends: (1) to 
discourage and act as a deterrent upon future 
criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so 
that he may not harm society and (3) to correct 
and rehabilitate the offender. There is no place 
in the scheme for punishment for its own sake, 
the product simply of vengeance or retribution, 
[citations omitted]. A legislative mitigation of 
the penalty for a particular crime represents a 
legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or 
the different treatment is sufficient to meet the 
legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is 
to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty 
after such a pronouncement; the excess in 
punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose 
other than to satisfy a desire for vengeance. As 
to a mitigation of penalties, then, it is safe to 
assume, as the modern rule does, that it was the 
legislative design that the lighter penalty 
should be imposed in all cases that subsequently 
reach the courts. 
Belt, 479 P.2d at 793 (quoting Oliver, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02). 
In State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971), the Supreme 
Court reiterated that where a statute reducing the penalty 
becomes effective before sentencing, the defendant is entitled to 
be sentenced under the lesser penalty. See also Shelmidine v. 
Jones, 550 P.2d 207, 211 (Utah 1976); State v. Saxton, 519 P.2d 
1340, 1342 (Utah 1974). In other words, a defendant must be 
sentenced in accordance with the law at the time of sentencing. 
Id. at 336. The Tapp Court noted three considerations behind 
such a rule: 
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[I]t is the prerogative of the legislature, 
expressing the will of the people, to fix the 
penalties for crimes and the courts should give 
effect to the enactment and the effective date 
thereof as so declared . . . [T]o insist on the 
prior existing harsher penalty is a refusal to 
accept and keep abreast of the process which has 
been continuing over the years of ameliorating 
and modifying the treatment of antisocial 
behavior by changing the emphasis from vengeance 
and punishment to treatment and rehabilitation. 
In the same tenor are the time-honored rules of 
the criminal law generally favorable to one 
accused of a crime: that in case of doubt or 
uncertainty as to the degree of crime, he is 
entitled to the lesser; and correlated thereto: 
that as to an alternative between a severe or a 
lenient punishment, he is entitled to the latter. 
Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. 
State v. Miller, 464 P.2d 844 (Utah 1970), is 
distinguishable from the decisions in Belt and Tapp in that 
Miller was sentenced prior to the effective date of the new 
statute. The sentence imposed prior to a change in the law is 
therefore imposed in accordance with the law in effect at the 
time of sentencing and should stand. Tapp, 490 P.2d at 336. 
In cases where an amendment reducing the criminal penalty 
becomes effective prior to sentencing, the Supreme Court has 
"consistently held that in such situations, 'the law in force at 
the time of sentencing govern[s] . . .'" Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 
788, 792 (Utah 1990) (quoting Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343, 344 
(Utah 1975)) (emphasis in original). See also Saxton, 519 P.2d 
at 1342 (defendant is entitled to lesser punishment if penalty 
for offense is reduced before imposition of sentence). 
Courts from other jurisdictions have also held that a 
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment 
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where the change in the law takes effect prior to sentencing. 
See, e.g., In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1965) ("If the 
amendatory statute lessening punishment becomes effective prior 
to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final then, in our 
opinion, it, and not the old statute in effect when the 
prohibited act was committed, applies."); In re Kirk, 408 P.2d 
962 (Cal. 1965) (where statute was amended prior to sentencing by 
ameliorating the punishment, defendant was entitled to benefit of 
amended statute); In re Daup, 408 P.2d 957, 958 (Cal. 1965) 
(same); People v. Thomas, 525 P.2d 1136 (Colo. 1974) (same). 
In Estrada, the court explained the rationale behind the 
rule requiring a defendant to be given the benefit of a lesser 
punishment which is in effect at the time of sentencing. The 
court pointed out that because the legislature had determined 
that a lesser penalty was appropriate for the crime at issue, it 
is an "inevitable inference" that such lesser punishment should 
be applied even if the crime was committed prior to the effective 
date of the new statute. 
When the legislature amends a statute so as to 
lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly 
determined that its former penalty was too severe 
and that a lighter punishment is proper as a 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited 
act. It is an inevitable inference that the 
Legislature must have intended that the new 
statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every 
case to which it constitutionally could apply. 
Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951. 
The Utah legislature amended Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
based on a recognition that the property value classifications in 
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the statute had not been amended in twenty years, and that the 
amendment would help ensure that only the most serious theft 
offenders would be sentenced to prison. See 51st Leg., Gen. 
Sess., H.B. 159 (Tape #2, February 9, 1995) (statement of 
Rep. Ellertson); 51st Leg., Gen. Sess., H.B. 159 (Tape #44, 
February 28, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hillyard) contained in 
Addendum C. The statute itself and legislative history contained 
in Addendum C demonstrate that the legislature determined that 
the former penalties were too severe. The "inevitable inference" 
is that the statute should apply to cases in which the defendant 
is sentenced after the effective date of the amendments. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) also suggests that the 
statute in effect at the time of sentencing should apply. It 
states: 
Any offense committed prior to the effective date 
of this code shall be governed by the law, 
statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time 
of commission thereof, except that a defense or 
limitation on punishment available under this 
code shall be available to any defendant tried or 
retried after the effective date. An offense 
under the laws of this state shall be deemed to 
have been committed prior to the effective date 
of this act if any of the elements of the offense 
occurred prior thereto. 
Yates argued that he should be sentenced for a class B 
misdemeanor in accordance with the statute in effect at the time 
of sentencing. R. 133-34. The trial judge rejected that 
argument, stating that it was his "own failures to appear that 
delayed the process." R. 133. The court also stated: 
I will sentence the defendant on the class A 
misdemeanor, which is what he plead to, which is 
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consistent with the facts as he represented them 
to me at the change of plea, and it is also 
consistent with the law that was in effect at the 
time he entered his plea. And I will also note, 
once again, that the reason he was not sentenced 
on February 17th is because he chose to absent 
himself from the proceedings. The reason he was 
not sentenced on April 14th is that, once again, 
he chose to absent himself from the proceedings. 
R. 14 0. The trial court determined not to sentence Yates to a 
class B misdemeanor because the court found it not "appropriate 
under the facts, under the law, under the totality of the 
circumstances." R. 141. 
The trial court's conclusion is incorrect. Yates pled 
guilty to theft of property valued at more than $100 and not more 
than $250. R. 17-18, 119-20; see Addendum B. This clearly fits 
within the class B misdemeanor limits under the version of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-412 in effect at the time of sentencing. 
Yates' failure to appear on prior sentencing dates is 
irrelevant in analyzing this issue. First, the record fails to 
establish the reason for Yates' absence. Hence, there is no 
showing that Yates knowingly and voluntarily absented himself 
from court. Although Yates was present at sentencing, the court 
made no attempt to ascertain the reason for his absence. 
Second, even if Yates had voluntarily failed to appear, 
he had already been penalized by being held without bail. R. 48, 
55. In addition, the trial judge refused to give him credit for 
time served due to his failures to appear. R. 141. Furthermore, 
the criminal code sets forth the crime of Bail Jumping in Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-312 (1995). To be convicted of that crime, the 
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State must file additional charges and prove the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.2 The State has not offered such proof in this 
case. The trial judge incorrectly imposed a sentence greater 
than the statutory maximum class B misdemeanor sentence based on 
unproven conduct extraneous to the elements of the theft crime 
charged. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), 
overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) 
(double jeopardy precludes multiple punishment for single 
offense). 
Finally, case law is contrary to the trial judge's 
conclusion. The rationale behind the decisions holding that the 
lesser punishment must be ordered applies regardless of whether a 
defendant voluntarily avoided sentencing. See, e.g., Belt, 479 
P.2d 791; Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062. 
In at least one Utah case, the defendant's sentencing 
occurred after the effective date of the statute due to the 
defendant's violation of a court order by leaving the state. 
Although the defendant's actions caused the delay in sentencing, 
the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless gave him the benefit of the 
lesser punishment. See Belt, 479 P.2d 791. While the Belt Court 
did not directly address the issue of whether a defendant who is 
responsible for the delay in sentencing is entitled to the 
benefit of a lesser penalty which is in effect at the time of 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 77-20a-l et seq. (1995) sets forth the 
Bail Forfeiting Procedure. This is an additional punishment for 
defendants who bail out and later fail to appear. 
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sentencing, the decision in Belt implicitly directs that the 
defendant's responsibility is irrelevant. 
In In re Fink, 433 P.2d 161 (Cal. 1967), the defendant 
pled guilty to escaping from a prison camp. Prior to judgment 
and sentence on the matter, defendant escaped from the county 
jail. At the time of the guilty plea, the penalty for escape was 
a minimum of one year and a maximum of life. However, at the 
time of sentencing, the legislature had amended the sentence to a 
minimum of six months and a maximum of five years. 
The State argued that the defendant's conduct extended 
the prosecution past the effective date of the new law and the 
defendant should therefore not benefit from the new legislation. 
The court rejected that argument, pointing out that wrongful 
conduct was immaterial and that the argument ignored the basic 
rationale for giving a defendant the benefit of the change in the 
law: 
When the legislature amends a statute so as to 
lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly 
determined that its former penalty was too severe 
and that a lighter punishment is proper as 
punishment for the commission of the prohibited 
act. It is an inevitable inference that the 
legislature must have intended that the new 
statute imposing the new lighter penalty now 
deemed to be sufficient should apply to every 
case to which it constitutionally could apply. 
Fink, 433 P.2d at 162 (quoting Estrada, 408 P.2d at 951). 
In Palmer, 595 P.2d 1060, the defendant pled guilty to 
possession of more than one-half ounce of marijuana, which at the 
time carried a penalty of two to fifteen years imprisonment and a 
maximum fine of $10,000. The defendant failed to appear for 
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sentencing on several occasions over a four-year period. When 
the defendant was finally sentenced, the penalty for possession 
of over one-half ounce of marijuana had changed to a maximum $100 
fine. 
The Palmer court held that the trial judge erred in not 
sentencing Palmer pursuant to the statute in effect at the time 
of sentencing. The court determined that Palmer's statement as 
to how much marijuana he had was irrelevant. Instead, the nature 
of the crime to which Palmer pled guilty controlled. Palmer, 595 
P.2d at 1062. The court reasoned that "'a defendant is entitled 
to the benefits of amendatory legislation when the relief is 
sought before finality has attached to the judgment of 
conviction.'" Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062 (quoting Glazier v. 
People, 565 P.2d 935 (Colo. 1977)). The court also noted that 
"[f]inality cannot attach to a judgment until sentencing occurs." 
Palmer, 595 P.2d at 1062. 
In the present case, as in Palmer, the nature of the 
crime to which Yates pled guilty controls the sentence to be 
imposed. The crime to which Yates pled guilty involved 
unauthorized control over property "valued between $100 and 
$250." See Addendum B. Under the amended statute in effect at 
the time of Yates7 sentencing, the trial judge should have 
sentenced Yates for a class B misdemeanor. The trial judge erred 
in concluding that the statute in effect at sentencing did not 
apply because Yates was responsible for the delay in sentencing. 
Controlling case law, the legislative intent behind the 
14 
amendment, and case law from other jurisdictions establish that 
the trial judge erred in sentencing Yates for a class A 
misdemeanor rather than the lesser punishment under the statute 
in effect at the time of sentencing. 
REASONS WHY ORAL ARGUMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED 
AND AN OPINION ISSUED 
Oral argument should be granted and a published opinion 
issued. A published opinion would clarify that the amendments to 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 apply regardless of whether the 
defendant is responsible for a delay in sentencing. Oral 
argument would aid in fully analyzing the issue. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court remand 
this case with an order directing the trial court to enter a 
correct sentence. 
SUBMITTED this *?/ day of October, 1995. 
JO^N C. WATT T 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
REBECCA HYDE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84102, and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 
236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 5/ day of 
October, 1995. 
DELIVERED this day of October, 1995. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-1-103. Application of code — Offense prior to effective 
date. 
(1) The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punish-
ment for, and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense 
defined outside this code; provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
(2) Any offense committed prior to the effective date of this code shall be 
governed by the law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at the time of 
commission thereof, except that a defense or limitation on punishment 
available under this code shall be available to any defendant tried or retried 
after the effective date. An offense under the laws of this state shall be deemed 
to have been committed prior to the effective date of this act if any of the 
elements of the offense occurred prior thereto. 
History: C. 1963, 76-1-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-103. 
76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction — Term of imprison-
ment. 
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 
imprisonment as follows: 
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding one 
year; 
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding six 
months; 
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not exceeding ninety 
days. 
76-6-404. Theft — Elements. 
^ A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over 
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
76-6-412, Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
O^cj^N treble damages against receiver of stolen prop-
^ erty. 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: • 
(i) value of the property or services exceeds $1,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than $250 but not more 
than $1,000; \ 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 1 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry;' 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
more than $100 but does not exceed $250; or J 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen was 
$100 or less. 2 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-. 
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the, 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. * 
76-6-412. Theft — Classification of offenses — Action for 
($>uop. l^S^trcbk damages against receiver of stolen prop-
erty* 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this chapter shall be 
punishable: 
(a) as a felony of the second degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $5,000; 
(ii) property stolen is a firearm or an operable motor vehicle; 
(iii) actor is armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the theft; or 
(iv) property is stolen from the person of another; 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is or exceeds $1,000 but is less 
than $5,000; 
(ii) actor has been twice before convicted of theft, any robbery, or 
any burglary with intent to commit theft; or 
(iii) property taken is a stallion, mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, 
steer, ox, bull, calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or poultry; 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is or 
exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000; or 
(d) as a class B misdemeanor if the value of the property stolen is less 
than $300. 
(2) Any person who has been injured by a violation of Subsection 76-6-408(1) 
may bring an action against any person mentioned in Subsection 76-6-
408(2)(d) for three times the amount of actual damages, if any sustained by the 
plaintiff, costs of suit and reasonable attorneys' fees. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6-412, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
1973, ch. 196, 9 76-6-412; 1974, ch. 32, 9 18; ment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the 
1975, ch. 48, 9 1; 1977, ch. 89, 9 1; 1989, ch. value amounts in Subsections (IXaXi), (lXbXi), 
78, 9 I; 1995, ch. 291, 9 14. (1XO, and (IXdl 
ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL !&?$&$<* M I I T 
Third Judicial District 
STATE OF UTAH , . „ « • - « 
JAN 1 3 1995 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Defendant. 
STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, 
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL, 
AND ORDER 
Deputy CJw* 
Case No. ISft {WiVS FS 
JUDGE \ j { ^ 
COMES NOW, JMs&tlT/^M/n , the defendant in this 
case and hereby acknowledges and certifies the following: 
I have entered a plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the following crime(s): 
CRIME & STATUTORY PROVISION DEGREE PUNISHMENT 
A. 
B. 
C. 
jk4h 
Ltf.lU-AtA 
tk* ti 
}/l/u<^//^/vO 
I have received a copy of the (charge) (information! against me, I have read it, 
and I understand the nature and elements of the offense(s) for which ! am pleading 
(guilty) (no contest). 
0 0 0 0 1 1 
The elements of the crime(s) of which I am charged are as follows: 
t^jL ^'J^JAlti^ J/JAAJ.^J 1*4*Mjft^j£sMf//^kf 
Mv conduct, and the conduct of other persons (for which I am criminally liable. 
^ 
y ricj "c fi ,
that constitutes the elements of the crime(s) charged are as follows: 
YyWJ^dr^ tfoi&ynj d^^,/ Mo AJ«/p— 
I am entering this/these plea(s) voluntarily and with knowledge and 
understanding of the following facts: 
1. I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I 
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the Court at no cost to me. I 
recognize that a condition of my sentence may be to require me to pay an amount, as 
determined by the Court, to recoup the cost of counsel if so appointed for me. 
2. I (have not) (have) waived my right to counsel. If I have waived my right to 
counsel, I have done so knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily for the following reasons: 
oooo i s 
3. If I have waived my right to counsel, I have read this statement and 
understand the nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this and other 
proceedings and the consequences of my plea of guilty. 
4. If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is 
/ t ^ f f i ^ > f ^ J » a n d ' h a v e had ^ opportunity to discuss this 
statement my rights and the consequences of my guilty plea with my attorney. 
5. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury. 
6. I know that if I wish to have a trial I have the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also 
know that I have the right to compel my witness(es) by subpoena at state expense to 
testify in court upon by behalf. 
7. I know that 1 have a right to testify in my own behalf but if I choose not to do 
so I can not be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse 
inferences will be drawn against me if I do not testify. 
8. I know that if I wish to contest the charge against me I need only plead "not 
guilty11 and the matter will be set for trial. At the trial the state of Utah will have the 
burden of proving each element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt If the trial 
is before a jury the verdict must be unanimous. 
9. I know that under the Constitution of Utah that if 1 were tried and convicted 
by a jury or by the judge that I would have the right to appeal by conviction and 
sentence to the Utah Court of Appeals or, where allowed, the Utah Supreme Court and 
that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, those costs would be paid by 
3 
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the state. 
10. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each offense to 
which I plead (guilty)^(no contest). I know that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) to an 
offense that carries a minimum mandatory sentence that I will be subjecting myself to 
serving a minimum mandatory sentence for that offense. I know that the sentences 
"yul 
may be consecutive and may be for a^serrt&rm, fine, or both. I know that in addition 
to a fine an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated §63-
63a-4, will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered by the Court to make 
restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes. 
11. I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for 
additional amounts, if my plea is to more than one charge. I also know that if I am on 
probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of which I have been 
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in 
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me. 
12. I know and understand that by pleading (guilty) (no contest) I am waiving 
my statutory and constitutional rights set out in the preceding paragraphs. I also know 
that by entering such plea(s) I am admitting and do so admit that I have committed the 
conduct alleged and I am guilty of the crime(s) for which my plea(s) is/are entered. 
13. My plea(s) of (guilty^ (no contest) (is) (is not) the result of a plea bargain 
between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of 
this plea bargain, if any, are futfy contained in the Plea-Agfeement attached to this-
(!JU^ 
" 0 0 0 0 2 r 
14. I know and understand that if I desire to withdraw my plea(s) of (guilty) (no 
contest) I must do so by filing a motion within thirty (30) days after entry of my plea. 
15. I know that any charge or sentencing concession of recommendation of 
probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing 
made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding 
on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe 
the court may do are also not binding on the Court. 
16. No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to 
induce me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained herein and in the 
attached plea agreement, have been made to me. 
17. I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and 
I understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything 
contained in this statement I do not wish to make any changes because ail of the 
statements are correct. 
18. I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney. , 
19. I am /y^y years of age; I have attended school through gtff u 
jgasie-and I can read and understand the English language or an interpreter has been 
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication or intoxicants 
which would impair my judgment when the decision was made to enter the plea(s). I 
am not presently under the influence of any drug, medication or intoxicants which 
impair my judgment 
20. I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of 
5 
000021 
understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my plea and free of any 
mental disease, defect or impairment that would prevent me from knowingly, 
intelligently and voluntarily entering my plea. 
DATED this \^P day of ^^UjJdJk^Li .«££ 
CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY 
I certify that I am the attorney for ^/Ljyp]u^l^( [I\AAL& the 
defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read 
it to him/her and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully 
understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To 
the best of my knowledge and belief after an appropriate investigation, the elements of 
the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly 
stated and these, along with the other representations and declarations made by the 
defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are accurate and true. 
Z
^Z£L2^ 
ATtfiRflEY F0R] DEFENDANT/BAf* # 
0 0 0 G 2 £ 
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
I 
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against 
. defendant. I have reviewed this statement of the *=r 
\ defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offense of the 
charge(s) and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes 
the offense are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to 
encourage a plea have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully 
contained in the statement and in the attached plea agreement or as supplemented on 
record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would 
support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are 
entered and acceptance of the piea^woMd serve the public interest 
blltlNG ATTORNEYJBAR # 
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ORDER 
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and the certification of 
the defendant and counsel, the court witnesses the signatures and finds the 
defendant's ptea of (guflty) (no contest) fs free/y and vofuntarffy made and it is so 
ordered that the defendant's plea of (guilty) (no contest) to the charge(s) set forth in the 
statement be accepted and entered. 
DONE IN COURT this 
8 
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the cost. You give up those rights in pleading guilty. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Have any promises or inducements 
been made to you to cause you to plead guilty today? 
THE DEFENDANT: No, ma'am. 
THE COURT: You know I'm not bound by the 
favorable recommendations that the state may make. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: I'll do what I feel is appropriate, 
given all of the facts and circumstances. And you know 
that if I don't give you a sentence you want or expect, 
that's not the basis for withdrawing your plea. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: Having all of these rights in mind, 
sir, I'm going to ask you now how you plead to theft, a 
class A misdemeanor, occurring at 1260 West Pacific 
Avenue, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
October 22nd, '94, in violation of 76-6-404 of the code, 
in that you, as a defendant and a party, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of 
Raylynn Coumier, with the purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof, and that the value of the property was more than 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 0 0 0 1 1 fc 
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$100, but less than $250, How do you plead? 
THE DEFENDANT: Guilty. 
THE COURT: Your plea of guilty is received and 
entered as a conviction at this time. In entering the 
same as a conviction, the court finds the plea is knowing, 
voluntary, freely entered, and intelligently entered, with 
a full understanding of the legal consequences. 
I base that finding upon statements of counsel, 
the defendant's statements, orally and in his written 
statement or affidavit, and the fact that the defendant 
has heard at least one other change of plea. I referenced 
that record by interlineation. He's indicated he paid 
attention, I observed him to be paying attention. 
Most importantly, I base this upon my careful 
observation of his appearance and demeanor. I find that 
he is intelligent, and paid careful attention. 
You now have two other rights that come into 
play. One of the those is the right to be sentenced in no 
less than two and no more than thirty days. You also have 
the right to seek to withdraw a plea of guilty if you have 
the legal basis for doing so, within thirty days of 
entering the plea. That thirty days starts to run today. 
Do you understand those rights? 
THE DEFENDANT: I do. 
THE COURT: It seems that a presentence report 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 00 012( 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
ERNEST W. JONES, Bar No. 1736 
Deputy County Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
LOUIS RICKY YATES, 
DOB 9 / 3 / 6 9 
OTN 
& • 
D e f e n d a n t . 
S c r e e n e d b y : E. JONES 
A s s i g n e d t o : E. JONES 
BAIL: $ 1 5 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 
FS 
The undersigned Det. Jann Farris - Salt Lake City Police 
Department, under oath states on information and belief that the 
defendant, committed the crime of: 
COUNT I ^ ^ ft W W ' 
THEFT, a Third—Degree Felony, at 1260 West Pacific Avenue, in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about October 22, 
1994, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 404, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, 
LOUIS RICKY YATES, a party to the offense, obtained or 
exercised unauthorized control over the property of Raylynn 
Coumier with the purpose to deprive the owner thereof, and 
that the value of said property was more than $250»00,- but 
not more than $-1,000*00;%, /frC^chs 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Jann Farris, Raylynn Coumier, Thomas Romero and Karen Kelly. 
u %J> \J V 
INFORMATION 
STATE OF UTAH V. LOUIS RICKY YATES 
County Attorney No. 94 012078 
Page 2 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant based this information on police report no. 94-
154530. 
The defendant had been living at Raylynn Courtlier1 s home. 
The defendant moved out on October 22, 1994. Thomas Romero 
helped the defendant move. Ms. Coumier discovered property 
valued at over $700.00 was missing from her home after the 
defendant left. Ms. Coumier spoke to Mr. Romero. He told her 
that he moved the missing property for the defendant but was lead 
to believe that it belonged to the defendant. The defendant was 
not authorized to take the property. 
DET. J. 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
me this 2~~^ day of November, 
1994. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: \ 'Vj^-<o° ^  
DAVID E. YOCOM, County Attorney 
RCBIN W. REESE 
Deputy County 
November 22, 
msy/94 012078 
t 0 C G U 
ADDENDUM C 
LEGISLATIVE DEBATE ON HOUSE BILL 159 (1995) 
SPONSORED BY R. LEE ELLERTSON 
HOUSE DEBATE 
51ST LEGISLATURE 
GENERAL SESSION 
DAY 25--FEBRUARY 9, 1995 
REPRESENTATIVE R. LEE ELLERTSON SPEAKING 
TAPE #2 STARTING AT 2116 
Rep. Ellertson: . . .We're bringing the property crimes in 
line with current policy of the state . . . 
We've made some changes in the property crimes. 
And let me call to your attention the matrix 
that has been handed out to you that I think 
would more clearly describe these theft 
statutes. The amounts of money which are used 
to distinguish between levels of theft and 
property crimes haven't been adjusted in twenty 
years. This makes an attempt to do that. And 
it shows you in the 1974 code where it was last 
amended and applies the consumer index and then 
also the recommendations in this statute. 
Those changes appear on page 11 of the bill. 
The value of stolen property makes a class A 
misdemeanor when the theft equals $100 and that 
brings that up now to $300. The amount for a 
third degree felony, $250, brings it up now to 
$1,000 and so on. I think the committee has 
gone through some very painstaking processes to 
see that these different kinds of property 
offenses are now consistent with the rest of 
the code. Forgery and illegal use of financial 
transaction card offenses have been made a 
third degree felony offense. This is because 
they attack the victim's name or his reputation 
or her reputation. The actual money that is 
then taken is punished according to the value 
of the theft. So you would have two charges-
one for forgery, then one for the value of the 
money that has been taken from you. I think 
this really is a welcome step when it comes to 
bringing us in line with current day statutes. 
The bill is a responsible effort, in my 
opinion, to use our correctional facilities, 
get the biggest bang for the dollar out of 
those correctional facilities, put people in 
there who really deserve to be there, and find 
us a suitable alternative to those who really 
don't need to be in that setting. The bill has 
been endorsed by the Utah Sentencing 
Commission, the Commission on Criminal and 
Juvenile Justice, Law Enforcement Legislative 
Committee, and the Statewide Association of 
Prosecutors. And, of course, as you heard a 
moment ago, the bill was unanimously approved 
through the House Judiciary Standing Committee. 
Mr. Speaker, that concludes my presentation of 
the bill. 
SENATE DEBATE 
51ST LEGISLATURE 
GENERAL SESSION 
DAY 44--FEBRUARY 28, 1995 
SENATOR HILLYARD SPEAKING 
TAPE #44 STARTING AT 1202 
Sen. Hillyard: . . . Then with the property crimes, we've 
always distinguished the levels of theft, like 
burglary, etc., based on the values of the 
property. And that was set back in 1973. 
Currently the value of property, if it's over 
$100, was a class A misdemeanor. We've raised 
that to $300. For a third degree felony, we've 
raised the value from $250 to $1,000. We've 
gone through the process of changing those and 
upgrading the values to make them more in 
keeping than the values of 1973. We've also 
taken forgery and the illegal use of financial 
credit cards . . . . 
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